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EXTRADITION AS A TOOL FOR UNITED 
STATES ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT: 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.K. DECISION 
NORRIS v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE 
HOME DEPARTMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
oreign executives who violate U.S. business laws can no longer 
seek refuge behind their own borders to avoid the U.S. criminal 
justice system.1 In 2005, for the first time, the United States convinced a 
foreign court to order the extradition of a foreign national indicted on a 
U.S. antitrust charge.2 Although extradition treaties are typically negoti-
ated to aid law enforcement in prosecution of transnational crimes like 
terrorism and drug trafficking, extradition is increasingly being used to 
pursue white-collar criminals between the United States and the United 
Kingdom.3 The availability of extradition for a price fixing offense has 
the potential to expand the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws 
and policies, and may have significant implications for international anti-
trust enforcement. 
In Norris v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,4 the Queen’s 
Bench Administrative Court of England (the “Court”)5 upheld an order 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Criminal Enforcement, 
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the Twentieth Annual National Institute 
on White Collar Crime: Charting New Waters in International Cartel Prosecutions 2 
(Mar. 2, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/214861.htm [hereinafter 
Hammond Speech]; Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Crossing the Border: U.S. Anti-
trust Agencies Take Action Globally, N.Y.L.J., Vol. 236, July 18, 2006. 
 2. See Hammond Speech, supra note 1, at 2. 
 3. See Joanne O’Connor, Retired City Exec Fights Extradition to US as Lopsided 
Treaty Comes Into Play, THE LAWYER, May 9, 2005 (“[S]ince the Extradition Act’s in-
ception, the US has filed 43 applications for extradition. And more than half of these—
22—are for white-collar offences.”). 
 4. The Queen on the Application of Ian Norris v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
[2006] EWHC 280 (Q.B. Admin). The Bow Street Magistrates’ Court presided over Nor-
ris’s initial extradition hearing, and held that price fixing and obstruction of justice 
charges were extraditable offenses under the Extradition Act 2003. Id. para. 1. The Mag-
istrates’ Court is the United Kingdom’s lowest level tribunal. See Her Majesty’s Court 
Service, The Court Structure of Her Majesty’s Court Service, http://www.hmcourts-
service.gov.uk/aboutus/structure/index.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). 
 5. The Queen’s Bench Administrative Court is the High Court of the United King-
dom that hears appeals from extradition decisions of the Magistrates’ Court. See Extradi-
tion Act, 2003, c. 41, §§ 103, 108 (U.K.). Further appeals are made to the House of 
Lords, the highest court of the United Kingdom, upon certification by the High Court. 
See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 114; see also House of Lords Briefing, 
F 
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made under the Extradition Act 20036 to extradite Ian P. Norris7 to the 
United States to face price fixing and obstruction of justice charges.8 As 
a result, Norris, the former CEO of the British corporation Morgan Cru-
cible Company (“Morgan”), was confronted with extradition to the 
United States to face a 2003 indictment from the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania for charges related to his involvement in an international 
cartel9 in the carbon products market.10 This ruling is a significant devel-
opment in international antitrust enforcement,11 particularly because the 
U.S. Department of Justice has placed high priority on the aggressive 
pursuit of international cartels.12 
                                                                                                             
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/HofLBpJudicial.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 
2007) (providing an overview of the House of Lords’ judicial functions). The Bow Street 
Magistrates’ Court presided over Norris’s extradition hearing, and held that price fixing 
and obstruction of justice charges were extraditable offenses under the Extradition Act 
2003. 
 6. Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41 (U.K.). 
 7. Norris is a citizen of the United Kingdom. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 1. 
 8. Id. para. 17. See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION UPDATE, Spring 
2006, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/216254.pdf (discussing the Norris case and the 
Division’s use of extraditing foreign nationals in its year review of cartel enforcement). 
 9. J. Anthony Chavez, The Carrot and the Stick Approach to Antitrust Enforcement, 
at 537–38 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8736, 2006).   
The term cartel is increasingly used in countries with competition laws 
throughout the world to refer to a pattern of collusive behavior by competing 
firms that typically involves the following: participating in meetings and con-
versations to discuss prices and volumes; agreeing to fix, increase, and main-
tain prices at certain levels; agreeing to allocate among the corporate conspira-
tors the approximate volume to be sold by them; exchanging sales and cus-
tomer information for the purpose of monitoring and enforcing adherence to the 
above-described agreements; issuing price announcements and price quotations 
in accordance with the above-described agreements; and/or selling at the 
agreed-upon sales volume allocations. 
Id. A hard core cartel is a clear agreement among competitors to control the market, most 
commonly in the form of price fixing. Contrast a hard core cartel with a cartel character-
ized by ambiguous conduct that could potentially serve the market. See ELEANOR M. FOX, 
ET AL., U.S. ANTITRUST IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 78 (2d ed. 2004). 
 10. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 1. 
 11. See Julian M. Joshua, Extradition: The DOJ’s New Foreign Policy Weapon, 
COMPETITION LAW INSIGHT, June, 14, 2005, at 12. 
 12. Recently, the United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division has focused 
on bringing criminal enforcement proceedings against international cartels that affect 
U.S. commerce. See MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER, A GUIDE 
TO THE OPERATION OF UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER KEY COMPETITION 
LAWS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 131 (2006); Hammond Speech, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
Current Department of Justice efforts emphasize individual accountability and “vigorous 
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This development concerns the U.K. business community.13 It also 
concerns Parliament that the United Kingdom’s current extradition legis-
lation gives the United States great freedom to extradite U.K. citizens, 
but no reciprocal arrangement exists to protect U.K. interests or to grant 
such latitude to the United Kingdom when seeking extradition from the 
United States.14 If the House of Lords, which has granted Norris leave to 
appeal, upholds the ruling that Norris should be extradited to the United 
States to face criminal antitrust charges, the United States will undoubt-
edly continue to pursue extradition to enforce its antitrust laws in the 
United Kingdom. This will certainly alter the landscape of international 
antitrust enforcement. If other countries follow the United Kingdom’s 
lead, the United States will have the opportunity to impose American 
antitrust ideals across the globe. This Note argues that the High Court 
should have reversed the lower court’s ruling in Norris because the statu-
tory requirement of dual criminality was not satisfied. It will also con-
sider the impact on global antitrust enforcement if the Norris decision is 
ultimately upheld by the House of Lords, and propose that the United 
States should not use extradition to broaden the reach of its antitrust law 
and policy. 
Part I of this Note outlines the framework of U.S.-U.K. extradition law 
between the United States and the United Kingdom. Part II discusses the 
developments that gave rise to the Norris case, including the U.S. in-
dictment and the U.K. extradition decision. Part III discusses the signifi-
cance of international antitrust enforcement, compares cartel and extra-
territorial jurisdiction policy in the United States and the United King-
dom, and considers arguments for and against extraditing antitrust viola-
tors. In conclusion, this Note explains why the Norris case was decided 
                                                                                                             
prosecution of foreign nationals who violate U.S. antitrust laws.” Id. The Department of 
Justice has several resources at its disposal for international cartel investigations—
improved assistance and coordination with foreign authorities, border watches, Interpol 
Red Notices, and extradition requests. Id. at 7–12. 
 13. See Joanne Harris, Analysis: Fair Trade?, THE LAWYER, Apr. 17, 2006 (“[T]here 
is a rising tide of anger in the UK over the way that the Government handles extradition 
requests from the US and the fact that laws designed to combat terrorism are being used 
against businesses.”). 
 14. See, e.g., 673 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 402 (“Mr. Norris’s case is a good 
example of the U.S. government using the simplified extradition regime in the U.K. to 
extradite a U.K. citizen in circumstances that appear wholly unsatisfactory. The original 
price fixing charge would not stand up in English courts, due to the fact that this was 
made an offense in the U.K. only with the passage of the Enterprise Act 2002 and the 
allegations relate to the 1990s . . . . [N]ot only is the basis of the charges questionable, but 
the majority of the conduct complained of occurred in the U.K. and Europe and not in the 
U.S.”). 
212 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:1 
incorrectly and argues that the United States should limit its pursuit of 
extradition of foreign antitrust offenders as a matter of policy. 
I. EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM 
The United States and the United Kingdom have a long history of ex-
tradition relations that dates back to 1794.15 Until recently, extradition 
procedure between the two countries was governed by the 1989 Extradi-
tion Act (“1989 Act”) in conjunction with the U.K.-U.S. Treaty of 1972 
and a 1985 supplemental treaty (collectively, the “1972 Treaty”).16 In 
2003, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a new Treaty on 
Extradition (“2003 Treaty”)17 to simplify the existing regime and accel-
erate extradition between the two countries.18 After more than two years, 
the 2003 Treaty was ratified by the United States Senate on September 
29, 2006.19 Still, an imbalance exists because the evidentiary require-
ments for each country are not parallel. 
Before the United States ratified the 2003 Treaty, the United Kingdom 
passed the Extradition Act 2003 (“2003 Act”), which repealed the 1989 
Act.20 The 2003 Act essentially implemented the terms of the 2003 
Treaty by including the United States as one of the countries to which it 
will extradite.21 The 1972 Treaty was still in force even after the 2003 
Act took effect, which complicated the extradition landscape between the 
United States and the United Kingdom.22 The evidentiary requirements 
                                                                                                             
 15. The first extradition treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom 
was the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, also known as Jay’s Treaty. See 
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1974, 8 Stat. 116; 
see also Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 20 (discussing the history of extradition be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom). 
 16. See Robert M. Osgood & Nathan J. Dunleavy, U.K.-U.S. Extradition for Antitrust 
Offenses, 2006 N.Y. ST. B.A. INT’L L. PRACTICUM 35, 35 (Spring 2006). 
 17. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., March 31, 2003, S.TREATY DOC. 
NO. 108-23 (2004) [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]. 
 18. See Joshua, supra note 11, at 12; Roger Smith, Rights & Wrongs: Going Over 
There, LAW SOCIETY GAZETTE, June 16, 2005. Another objective of the 2003 Treaty was 
to update the bilateral relationship between the United States and United Kingdom to 
align its terms with the U.S.-EU Treaty, Agreement on Extradition, June 25, 2003, U.S.-
EU, 2003 O.J. (L 181) 27. See Sean D. Murphy, New U.S./EU and U.S./U.K. Extradition 
Treaties, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 849 (2004). 
 19. See 152 CONG. REC. S1067 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006). 
 20. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, sched. 4. 
 21. See 667 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 712. 
 22. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 21. 
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of the 1972 Treaty were greater than those of the 2003 Act.23 However, 
U.S. ratification of the 2003 Treaty has brought the bilateral agreement 
into conformity with the U.K legislation.24 
The 2003 Act created new extradition procedures for all of the United 
Kingdom’s extradition partners, including the United States.25 Like the 
2003 Treaty, the 2003 Act created a more flexible regime for extradition 
in response to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks in the United 
States.26 A significant, and controversial, element of the 2003 Act is Or-
der 2003 (S.I. 2003/3334).27 The Order specially designates the United 
States as a territory for purposes of certain sections of the 2003 Act,28 
which effectively exempts the United States from the Act’s requirement 
to provide prima facie evidence in support of an extradition request.29 As 
a result of this special designation, the United States is merely required 
                                                                                                             
 23. Article IX of the 1972 Treaty provides that “[e]xtradition shall be granted only if 
the evidence be found sufficient according to the law of the requested Party either to 
justify the committal for trial of the person sought if the offense of which he is accused 
had been committed in the territory of the requested Party or to prove that he is the iden-
tical person convicted by the courts of the requesting Party.” Treaty on Extradition be-
tween the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., Oct. 21, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 227, 
available at 2003 WL 23527406. This issue is central to Norris’s argument in Norris. See 
infra Part III.C.1. 
 24. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 35 (“If the 2003 Treaty is ratified by the 
United States, the inconsistency between the designation and the express terms of the 
extant Treaty would disappear and citizens of the United Kingdom would cease to have 
any enforceable right based on it.”). 
 25. The Extradition Act 2003 is organized into two parts, Part 1 applying to Category 
1 territories, and Part 2 applying to Category 2 territories. See JULIAN B. KNOWLES, 
BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE EXTRADITION ACT 2003 4 (2004). Category 1 territories are 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. See Extradition, 2003, 
S.I. 2003/3333, art. 2, para. 2. Part 1 introduces new extradition procedures, including a 
statutory appeal process and reduced involvement of the Secretary of State. Id. A country 
may not be a Category 1 territory if it has the death penalty for criminal offenses. See 
Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 1(3). Additionally, Part 1 of the 2003 Act implements the 
European Arrest Warrant. See KNOWLES at 6. The United States is one of over 100 Cate-
gory 2 territories. See SI 2003/3334, art. 2. 
 26. See Joshua, supra note 11, at 12; Harris, supra note 13. In addition, the United 
Kingdom was motivated to revise its extradition legislation after Spain’s attempt in 
1998–2000 to extradite General Augusto Pinochet from the United Kingdom for crimes 
against humanity. See KNOWLES, supra note 25, at 3–4. 
 27. See Extradition, 2003, S.I. 2003/3334. 
 28. Statutory Instrument 2003/3334 paragraph 3 designates Category 2 territories for 
purposes of section 71(4), 73(5), 84(7), and 86(7) of the Act. Id. 
 29. Id. at Explanatory Note. 
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to provide “information,”30 a low standard that facilitates a relatively 
simple and speedy United States extradition request from the United 
Kingdom.31 However, even with ratification of the 2003 Treaty, the 
United Kingdom is not afforded the same luxury when requesting extra-
dition from the United States.32 
A critical reform of the 2003 Treaty was adoption of a dual criminality 
requirement, where an offense is extraditable only if the conduct is 
criminalized in both systems.33 The reform replaced the “list” system, in 
which extraditable offenses were enumerated.34 The 2003 Act also 
adopted a dual criminality requirement, requiring that the conduct for 
which extradition is requested is punishable with imprisonment for one 
year or greater in both the United Kingdom and the Category 2 terri-
tory.35 Modern extradition treaties often adopt a dual criminality re-
quirement to determine whether an act is an extraditable offense,36 so this 
reform is not extraordinary in comparison to other extradition treaties. 
However, the broader definition of what constitutes an “extraditable of-
fense” under the new regime complicated the Norris extradition. 
A. Defining “Extradition Offense” Under the 2003 Act 
The 2003 Act defines “extradition offense” differently for two con-
texts, one for persons not sentenced for the offense, and the other for per-
sons so sentenced.37 The defendant’s “conduct” is the essential concept 
                                                                                                             
 30. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 71 (requiring “information” rather than “evi-
dence”). 
 31. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 84(7) (permitting the Secretary of State to 
exempt a territory from the need for prima facie evidence requirement of section 84(1)). 
 32. The United Kingdom must show “probable cause” in U.S. extradition requests. 
See Extradition Treaty, S.TREATY DOC. NO. 108-23, art. 8. In Norris, a central argument 
is that the evidentiary terms of the 1972 Treaty directly conflict with the evidentiary 
terms of the 2003 Act. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 34. The Court rejected this 
argument. See infra p. 15. 
 33. See Joshua, supra note 11, at 12. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See supra note 25 for Category 2 territory definition; Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, 
§§ 137–138; KNOWLES, supra note 25, at 12, 22. 
 36. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW 
AND PRACTICE 466–67, 481 (Oceana Publications) (4th ed. 2002). 
 37. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, §§ 137–138; KNOWLES, supra note 25, at 18. 
Norris was not sentenced, thus the applicable definition of “extradition offense” can be 
found in section 137. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 2. This Note will address 
extradition between the United States, a Category 2 territory, and the United Kingdom 
under the 2003 Act. The definition of “extradition offense” for Category 1 territories may 
be found in part 1, sections 64–65 of the 2003 Act. 
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in section 137 of the 2003 Act.38 Section 137 provides that conduct must 
meet a dual criminality requirement.39 Different subsections of section 
137 apply depending on where the conduct occurred in relation to the 
United Kingdom and the Category 2 territory.40 
1. Section 137(2)(a)—Where Did the Conduct Occur? 
Section 137(2)(a) requires the conduct to have occurred in the Cate-
gory 2 territory in order to constitute an extradition offense.41 The High 
Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division (“Queen’s Bench”), in Ber-
mingham & Others v. The Director of the Serious Fraud Office,42 inter-
preted section 137(2)(a).43 The central issue in Bermingham was whether 
section 137(2)(a) is only met if the defendant’s conduct targeted the 
Category 2 territory, yet did not exclusively occur there.44 The defen-
dants in Bermingham urged the Queen’s Bench to find that 137(2)(a) was 
not met because their conduct caused no harm in the United States, only 
in the United Kingdom, and their conduct did not target the United 
States.45 The Queen’s Bench rejected this argument, and held that when 
the defendants’ conduct took place outside the Category 2 territory and 
when the harmful effects were felt there, it qualifies as conduct that oc-
curred in the Category 2 territory and therefore meets the requirements of 
                                                                                                             
 38. See The Queen on the Application of Bermingham & Others v. The Director of 
the Serious Fraud Office [2006] EWHC 200, para. 81 (“The critical concept in s.137 is 
the defendant’s ‘conduct.’ ”). 
 39. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 137. 
 40. See id.; KNOWLES, supra note 25, at 18. Section 137(2) applies when the conduct 
occurs in the Category 2 territory. Section 137(3) applies when the conduct occurs out-
side the Category 2 territory. Section 137(4) applies when the conduct occurs outside the 
Category 2 territory and no part of it occurs in the United Kingdom. This section will 
discuss section 137(2) because that is the relevant subsection for the Norris case. 
 41. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 137(2)(a) (“The conduct constitutes an extradi-
tion offense in relation to the category 2 territory if these conditions are satisfied—(a) the 
conduct occurs in the category 2 territory . . . .”). 
 42. In Bermingham, the United States sought extradition of three British executives 
for fraud related to the affairs of Enron Corporation. See Bermingham, [2006] EWHC 
200, para. 20. The executives were employed in London by the bank Greenwich 
NatWest, and they are each citizens and residents of the United Kingdom. Id. The execu-
tives challenged the extradition order from Bow Street, arguing that if they were to be 
tried at all it should be in England. Id. para. 57. The executives reasoned that the conduct 
that gave rise to the charge in the United States prosecutors’ case occurred in the United 
Kingdom, and the victim of the alleged fraud was a U.K. institution, thus the require-
ments of section 137(2) were not met. Id. para. 83. 
 43. Id. para. 84. 
 44. Id. para. 83. 
 45. Id. 
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section 137(2)(a).46 Thus, the Queen’s Bench held that 137(2)(a) was 
satisfied because the defendants’ “alleged conduct substantially took 
place . . . in the United States, as well as in the United Kingdom.”47 
2. Section 137(2)(b)—Is Dual Criminality Met? 
Section 137(2)(b) introduces the dual criminality requirement of an ex-
tradition offense.48 Dual criminality is an essential principle, one that the 
House of Lords has said “lies at the heart of [the United Kingdom’s] law 
of extradition.”49 Dual criminality may be satisfied even when the con-
duct complained of in the requesting territory does not have a “precise 
equivalent” offense in the United Kingdom.50 The judge at the extradi-
tion hearing is not required to find a matching offense, but is required to 
consider the conduct that instigated the foreign charge and determine 
whether that conduct would constitute an offense in the United Kingdom, 
had it occurred there.51 
B. The U.S.-U.K. Extradition Regime—Political Reaction and Legislative 
Response 
The U.S. delay in ratification of the 2003 Treaty became a significant 
political issue in the United Kingdom.52 The primary objection to the 
                                                                                                             
 46. See Bermingham, [2006] EWHC 200, para. 84. 
 47. Id. para. 86. 
 48. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 137(2)(b) (“The conduct constitutes an extradi-
tion offense in relation to the category 2 territory if these conditions are satisfied…(b) the 
conduct would constitute an offense under the law of the relevant part of the United 
Kingdom punishable with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 12 
months or a greater punishment if it occurred in that part of the United Kingdom.”). The 
“relevant part of the United Kingdom” is defined in section 137(8)(a) as “the part of the 
United Kingdom in which the extradition hearing took place, if the question of whether 
conduct constitutes an extradition offense is to be decided by the Secretary of State.” See 
Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 137(8). 
 49. In Re Al-Fawwaz, [2001] UKHL 69, para. 94. 
 50. See Howard Welsh, Lee Hope Thrasher v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
[2006] EWHC 156 (Admin.), para. 24 (finding that dual criminality was satisfied when 
“the conduct which constitutes the US offense of mail fraud in relation to forged instru-
ments would constitute the offense of forgery in England”). 
 51. Unpublished decision by District Judge Nicholas Evans, Gov’t of the United 
States of America v. Ian P. Norris, June 1, 2005 [hereinafter Magistrates’ Court Decision] 
(on file with author). 
 52. See, e.g., 673 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 399; 667 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th 
ser.) (2004) 711. The Norris case, as well as several other recent U.S.-U.K. extraditions 
for white collar criminals, have garnered substantial media attention in the U.K, particu-
larly about the 2003 Treaty. See, e.g., Nikki Tait, Norris Cartel Appeal Begins, FIN. 
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2003 Treaty was the lack of reciprocity, that is, that the evidentiary stan-
dards were unbalanced.53 A particular area of concern was that the U.K. 
government essentially waived its citizens’ rights with the 2003 Act and 
potentially subjected them to “oppressive legal action” from foreign 
powers.54 One commentator even urged that the United Kingdom 
“should tear up [its] signature” before the “one-sided treaty” was ratified 
by the United States.55 Additionally, U.K. citizens were skeptical of the 
2003 Treaty because it was negotiated and signed in secret, so there was 
no opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny.56 Many voiced concerns that 
U.S. officials are unpredictable and, absent a requirement to provide evi-
dence, will embark on “fishing expeditions.”57 
Soon after the 2003 Act took effect, its critics urged Parliament to ter-
minate the 2003 Treaty,58 requested a new Order revoking the United 
States’ special designation, and proposed amendment of Part 2 of the 
2003 Act to permit refusal of extradition where the alleged offense was 
committed wholly or mainly in the United Kingdom.59 Most recently, the 
House of Commons included 2003 Act amendments in proposed legisla-
tion.60 As the bill progressed through Parliament, the House of Lords 
                                                                                                             
TIMES UK, Oct. 18, 2006; Michael Binyon, One-Sided Treaty Was Meant to Handle Ter-
rorist Suspects, LONDON TIMES, June 28, 2006. 
 53. See 673 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 404 (Lord Goodhart of the House of 
Lords stated that “[t]he 2003 treaty is unfair because it is not reciprocal”); Smith, supra 
note 18; Eoin O’Shea, U.K. Businesses Need to Beware the Long Arm of U.S. Law, THE 
LAWYER, August 14, 2006 (“[T]he effect in law is that Britons are uniquely vulnerable to 
extradition to the U.S., where they are likely to face lengthy delays before trial, high and 
irrecoverable costs, much higher sentences and an unfamiliar legal playing field.”). In 
addition to the lack of reciprocity, Lord Goodhart set forth four reasons why the United 
Kingdom should not agree to extradition to the United States without evidence: (i) the 
variable standard of justice in the United States, i.e. fifty-one different jurisdictions with 
standards ranging from “good” to “very bad;” (ii) lack of adequate legal aid in the United 
States for those who can not afford a lawyer; (iii) excessive plea bargaining in the United 
States; and (iv) increasing use of extraterritorial criminal legislation by the United States, 
especially in fraud cases. See 667 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 713. 
 54. See 673 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 403. 
 55. Smith, supra note 18. 
 56. See 667 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 711; Joshua, supra note 11, at 12; 
O’Connor, supra note 3. 
 57. Smith, supra note 18. 
 58. Either state may terminate the treaty at any time pursuant to Article 24 of the 
2003 Treaty, and termination becomes effective six months after receipt of notice. See 
Extradition Treaty, S.TREATY DOC. NO. 108-23, art. 24. 
 59. See 667 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 714. 
 60. The House of Commons introduced the Police and Justice Bill on January 25, 
2006. The bill primarily contains police reform measures, and also includes miscellane-
ous items such as amendments to the Extradition Act 2003. See Police and Justice Bill, 
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voted to remove the United States as a designated Category 2 territory.61 
The House of Commons disagreed with the Lords’ proposed amend-
ment,62 and the resulting legislation did not include such a provision.63 
The political melee in the United Kingdom surrounding the 2003 
Treaty and the 2003 Act applied pressure on the United States to ratify 
the treaty.64 The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (“Commit-
tee”), the group charged with reviewing treaties negotiated by the execu-
tive branch, met in July 2006 to hear testimony on the 2003 Treaty.65 At 
that hearing, Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, urged the 
Committee to approve the 2003 Treaty because of its law enforcement 
benefits.66 He highlighted the advantage of exemption from showing 
prima facie evidence in extradition requests.67 Additionally, McNulty 
cautioned the Committee that failure to approve the Treaty would have 
                                                                                                             
2006, H.C. Bill [119] (U.K.) (originally introduced as H.C. Bill [119] on Jan. 25, 2006, 
upon first reading in House of Lords became H.L. Bill [104] on May 6, 2006, upon con-
sideration it became H.C. Bill [230]). When major alterations are made to a U.K. bill, the 
complete text is reprinted and given a completely new number. The bill is again reprinted 
with a new number when passed to the other House for approval. JEAN DANE & PHILIP A. 
THOMAS, HOW TO USE A LAW LIBRARY 74 (2d ed. 1987). The complete chronology of the 
Police and Justice Bill is available at Lawtel UK. 
 61. See Lords Amendments to the Police and Justice Bill, H.C. Bill [230] (Oct. 19, 
2006) (The House of Lords suggested that the following new clause be inserted: 
“[d]esignation of Part 2 territories: omission of United States of America. In the list of 
territories in paragraph 3(2) of the Extradition Act 2003 (Designation of Part 2 Territo-
ries) Order 2003 (S.I. 2003/3334) ‘the United States of America’ is omitted.”). 
 62. See Commons Amendments to Lords Amendments, H.C. Bill [230] (Oct. 25, 
2006). 
 63. See Police and Justice Act, 2006, c. 48, sched. 13. 
 64. See Hearing on the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty Before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Committee Hearing] (statement of 
Samuel L. Witten) (“[O]ur delay in ratification has become a major political issue in the 
United Kingdom. The issue is being seen by the British media and public as a question of 
good faith on the part of the United States. Inaction on our part . . . is undermining British 
public opinion that we are a reliable ally.”); Tim Reid, Senate is Warned of Discontent 
Here, TIMES UK, July 22, 2006. 
 65. See Committee Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Sen. Richard Lugar). The 
Committee suggested several reasons as to why it had yet to approve the 2003 Treaty. 
There was concern that (i) the 2003 Treaty does not guarantee U.S. citizens their constitu-
tional rights if tried in the United Kingdom, (ii) it potentially violates the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and (iii) it permits waiver of the Rule of Spe-
cialty, which ensures that a fugitive surrendered for one offense is not tried for other 
crimes. Id. In addition, the Irish-American lobby objected to ratification because they felt 
the 2003 Treaty would make it easier to prosecute IRA suspects and sympathizers living 
in the United States. Id. 
 66. Id. (statement of Paul J. McNulty). 
 67. Id. 
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serious negative consequences, emphasizing the United States’ relation-
ship with the United Kingdom and pressure there on Parliament to cor-
rect the imbalanced extradition relationship.68 Following this Committee 
hearing in July 2006, the Senate ratified the treaty on September 29, 
2006.69 
II. THE NORRIS EXTRADITION 
The Norris decision was one of the catalysts that brought discussion of 
the unbalanced evidentiary standards of the 2003 Act to the forefront of 
discussion in the United Kingdom, both in the legal community and 
among the citizenry.70 This case lies at the intersection of extradition and 
antitrust law, and marks a significant step towards expanding the reach of 
United States antitrust enforcement globally. The recent change in the 
perception of price fixing in the United Kingdom, where it is now re-
garded as unequivocally criminal, has made extradition available, an 
avenue of cooperation only available in the realm of criminal law.71 
A. Norris’s U.S. Indictment  
In 1999, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
initiated an investigation into U.S. federal antitrust offenses involving 
carbon products manufactured and sold by Morgan.72 Morgan was in-
volved in an industry wide price fixing conspiracy to coordinate prices 
for carbon products sold in the United States.73 Norris, a Morgan em-
ployee and company officer, allegedly conspired in organizing and oper-
ating the cartel.74 Additionally, Norris allegedly interfered with the 
United States’ investigation by organizing co-conspirators to provide 
false information, preparing a script for cartel participants to follow if 
                                                                                                             
 68. See Committee Hearing, supra note 64 (statement of Paul J. McNulty). 
 69. See 152 CONG. REC. S1067 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006). 
 70. See Anand Doobay, Extradition and Mutual Assistance—A Changing Landscape, 
THE CRIM. LAW., July/Aug. 2006, at 4. 
 71. Julian Joshua, The European Cartel Enforcement Regime Post-Modernization: 
How is it Working?, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1247, 1269 (2006). 
 72. See United States of America v. Ian P. Norris, Criminal No. 03-632, Indictment, 1 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Norris Indictment]. 
 73. See United States of America v. Ian P. Norris, Criminal No. 03-632, Second Su-
perseding Indictment, 1–2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Norris Second Supersed-
ing Indictment]; Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, paras. 5, 11. Three other Morgan executives 
were charged with obstruction of justice. Each pled guilty and served prison sentences in 
the United States. Subsidiaries Morgan Crucible and Morganite entered into a plea 
agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice. Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, paras. 11, 15. 
 74. See Norris Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 73, at 3; Norris, [2006] 
EWHC 280, para. 5. 
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questioned by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice or the 
federal grand jury, and destroying business files containing evidence of 
the anticompetitive agreement.75 
Morgan is headquartered in Windsor, England76 and has two United 
States subsidiaries.77 Norris was Chairman of the Carbon Division of 
Morgan from 1986 through 1998.78 Subsequently, Norris was Morgan’s 
CEO from 1998 through 2002.79 While Norris was a Morgan employee, 
the company was a major global manufacturer of carbon and maintained 
a dominant market share in the United States.80 
Norris was indicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Septem-
ber 2003 for obstruction of justice and conspiracy charges.81 A supersed-
ing indictment was filed in October 2003, which added price fixing con-
spiracy charges.82 In September 2004, a second superseding indictment 
was filed which made reference to sentencing guidelines.83 
B. Norris’s U.K. Extradition 
English authorities issued an arrest warrant for Norris at the request of 
the U.S. Department of Justice on December 31, 2004, and Norris was 
arrested on January 13, 2005.84 The Bow Street Magistrates’ Court held 
the extradition hearing on May 10–12, 2005,85 at which the District 
                                                                                                             
 75. Norris Indictment, supra note 72, at 3. 
 76. Id. at 1. 
 77. Morganite, Inc. is a subsidiary located in North Carolina, and Morgan Advanced 
Materials and Technology, Inc. is located in St. Mary’s, Pennsylvania. See Norris, [2006] 
EWHC 280, para. 5. 
 78. See Norris Indictment, supra note 72, at 1. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 5. 
 81. See Norris Indictment, supra note 72. The specific charges include: (i) violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 37, conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud United States, (ii) violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), knowingly . . . corruptly persuades another person . . . with 
intent to influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceed-
ing, and (iii) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B), to cause or induce any person to 
alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal and object with intent to impair the object’s integrity 
or availability for use in an official proceeding. 
 82. See United States of America v. Ian P. Norris, Criminal No. 03-632, Superseding 
Indictment (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2003). The additional charge was violation of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“every contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce . . . with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
 83. See Norris Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 73. 
 84. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 16. 
 85. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 139(1)(a) (“The appropriate judge is, in Eng-
land and Wales, a District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) designated for the purposes of this 
Part by the Lord Chancellor . . . .”). 
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Judge concluded that no factors existed to properly bar Norris’s extradi-
tion to the United States.86 The case was sent to the Secretary of State of 
the Home Department (“Secretary of State”) for a final extradition deci-
sion,87 and on September 29, 2005, he ordered Norris’s extradition.88 
Norris appealed the decisions of the District Judge and Secretary of 
State, but failed to persuade the Queen’s Bench Administrative Court89 to 
overturn the order for his extradition.90 In January 2007, the High Court 
of the Queen’s Bench Division rejected Norris’s appeal.91 The House of 
Lords, the highest court in the United Kingdom, has granted Norris leave 
to appeal.92 
C. The Appeal—Norris v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
Norris appealed the Secretary of State’s extradition order under section 
108 of the 2003 Act.93 The appeal encompassed two parts: (i) application 
for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse Norris’s 
request for removal of the United States as a designated territory94 and 
                                                                                                             
 86. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 16. 
 87. See Extradition Act, 2003, c. 41, § 70(1) (“The Secretary of State must issue a 
certificate under this section if he receives a valid request for the extradition to a category 
2 territory of a person who is in the United Kingdom.”). 
 88. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 17. The Secretary of State makes the extra-
dition decision based on the judge’s decision from the extradition hearing. See Extradi-
tion Act, 2003, c. 41, §§ 70(1), 87(3), 93(4). 
 89. The Administrative Court is a division of the High Court Queen’s Bench that 
exercises supervisory jurisdiction over inferior courts and tribunals. See Her Majesty’s 
Court Service, http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/admin.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 
2006). 
 90. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 52. 
 91. Norris v. United States of America, [2007] EWHC 71 (Admin); see also Nikki 
Tait, High Court Upholds Norris Extradition, FIN. TIMES UK, Jan. 25, 2007 (“Two High 
Court judges dismissed arguments that the price-fixing charges of which Mr. Norris is 
accused were not a criminal offence in the UK at the time and could not be an ‘extradi-
tion offence’.”). 
 92. Nina Goswami, Norris Extradition Saga Goes to the Lords, THE LAWYER, June 7, 
2007.  
 93. Section 108 provides: “If the Secretary of State orders a person’s extradition un-
der this Part, the person may appeal to the High Court against the order.” Extradition Act, 
2003, c. 41, § 108(1). The Extradition Act 2003 created a statutory right to appeal to the 
High Court and provides for a right of appeal to the House of Lords. The Act creates 
separate rights of appeal against decisions of the judge and against an extradition order 
made by the Secretary of State. See Bermingham, [2006] EWHC 200, para. 11. This 
process replaced the traditional process where an extradition defendant appealed by way 
of an application for a writ of habeas corpus as subjicientdum. See KNOWLES, supra note 
25, at 121–22. 
 94. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 1. 
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(ii) statutory appeals regarding whether the offenses specified in the ex-
tradition request were “extradition offenses” under section 137 of the 
2003 Act and whether any bars to extradition under the 2003 Act ex-
isted.95 The Court issued an opinion on the judicial review issue, and 
postponed consideration of the statutory appeals as the issue was pending 
in the Bermingham case.96 
1. Should the United States Remain a Designated Category 2 Territory? 
Norris argued that the United States should be removed from the list of 
countries designated under the Part 2 Order of the 2003 Act.97 Norris’s 
position was that this designation, which exempts the United States from 
providing a prima facie case to extradite a U.K. citizen, was illegal and 
irrational because the designation under the 2003 Act contradicts the ex-
press terms of the 1972 Treaty.98 Additionally, Norris argued that the 
Secretary of State’s refusal to remove the United States from this list of 
designated territories was also illegal.99 The underlying substance of 
Norris’s argument was that the 1972 Treaty provided U.K. citizens with 
enforceable rights and protections, and that the Secretary of State’s des-
ignation of the United States as a Category 2 territory subject to a lower 
evidentiary standard violated those rights.100 
Additionally, Norris criticized the 2003 Act because the United King-
dom included the United States as a Category 2 territory based on the 
expectation that the 2003 Treaty would soon be ratified.101 Norris argued 
that the United Kingdom was misled and the Secretary of State’s Order 
was based on a misunderstanding.102 Interestingly, Norris’s argument 
echoes the political debate about the 2003 Act, and even implicates the 
criticism that there is a lack of reciprocity between the United States and 
the United Kingdom in extradition procedure.103 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id. para. 2. 
 96. Id. para. 3. 
 97. Id. para. 18. The Order is S.I. 2003/3334. See supra notes 27–28 and accompany-
ing text. 
 98. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 35. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. para. 47. 
 102. Id. para. 47. 
 103. Id. para. 35. Norris argued that “[n]o sufficient effort has been made in the United 
States to seek ratification of the 2003 Treaty. The Government there had been ‘dilatory’, 
so that there is no immediate prospect of alleviating . . . a ‘glaring and continuing repug-
nance’ between the international obligations created by the 1972 Treaty, and the continu-
ing application of s84(7) to the United States. Moreover, there is an imbalance and ‘lack 
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The Court rejected Norris’s arguments, noting that the judiciary is not 
entitled to oversee the legislative process which led to the Order.104 The 
Court focused on the legality of the Secretary of State’s decision to re-
fuse Norris’s request for removal of the United States as a designated 
territory, and held that it was a legally sound decision.105 Specifically, the 
Court stated that the 2003 Act grants the Secretary of State the power to 
make orders, which permitted the United Kingdom to grant other states 
greater assistance in the extradition process, and the 2003 Act does not 
restrict exercise of that power based on reciprocity.106 The Court noted 
that nothing in the 2003 Act suggests that designation is dependent on a 
bilateral treaty between the United Kingdom and the requesting coun-
try.107 In sum, the Court declined to compel the Secretary of State to re-
move the Order’s designation to incent the United States to ratify the 
2003 Treaty, and refused to impair the Secretary’s powers under the 
2003 Act by forcing him to remove the United States.108 Moreover, part 
of Norris’s argument is moot now that the 2003 Treaty has been ratified 
in the United States.109 
2. Is the Specified Offense an “Extradition Offense” Under Section 137? 
The Court in Norris did not address whether or not the specified of-
fense for which the United States was seeking Norris’s extradition was 
an “extradition offense” under section 137 because the Queen’s Bench 
was addressing its interpretation in Bermingham.110 At Norris’s extradi-
tion hearing, the Bow Street Magistrates’ Court found that the offenses 
specified in the United States’ extradition request did in fact meet the 
requirements, and thus were “extradition offenses” as defined in section 
137.111 Norris challenged this finding in his appeal.112 In Bermingham, 
the Queen’s Bench discussed section 137 and its interpretation did not 
favor Norris. The Queen’s Bench holding in Bermingham precludes Nor-
ris’s argument that he should be tried in the United Kingdom for conduct 
that occurred there. Thus, Norris must rely on the argument that price 
                                                                                                             
of reciprocity’ in arrangements between the two sovereign states, which was never prop-
erly addressed.” Id.; see supra Part I.B. 
 104. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 45. 
 105. Id. para. 46. 
 106. Id. para. 45. 
 107. Id. para. 43. 
 108. Id. para. 52. 
 109. Id. para. 35. 
 110. Id. para. 3. 
 111. See Magistrates’ Court Decision, para. 8. 
 112. See Norris, [2006] EWHC 280, para. 1. 
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fixing was not a crime in the United Kingdom when he allegedly partici-
pated in the carbon-products cartel, and the dual criminality requirement 
of section 137(2)(b) is not satisfied.113 
Cartel participation was not a crime in the United Kingdom until en-
actment of the Enterprise Act 2002.114 The United States charged that 
Norris engaged in price fixing from 1986 until 2000.115 During this pe-
riod, the Competition Act 1998 (“1998 Act”) took effect.116 The 1998 
Act prohibited price fixing and market sharing agreements117 and im-
posed fines for violations,118 but did not impose a criminal penalty. To-
day, the Enterprise Act 2002 imposes criminal sanctions of up to five 
years imprisonment for individual cartel participation.119 
The lack of a criminal cartel offense during the time of Norris’s alleged 
violations did not impede the U.S. Department of Justice from arguing in 
Norris’s extradition request that the dual criminality requirement was 
met.120 Before the Enterprise Act 2002, the U.K. common law crime of 
conspiracy to defraud served to punish cartel participants where the 
agreement involved “dishonestly doing something prejudicial to an-
                                                                                                             
 113. See Harris, supra note 13. 
 114. See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. § 188. See also Julian M. Joshua, The U.K.’s New 
Cartel Offence and Its Implication for EC Competition Law: a Tangled Web, EUR. L. 
REV. 620, 620 (2003) [hereinafter Joshua, Tangled Web] (“[T]he U.K. government cre-
ated a new criminal offense in the Enterprise Act 2002.”); Angus MacCulloch, The Car-
tel Offense and the Criminalisation of United Kingdom Competition Law, J. BUS. L. 616, 
616 (2003) (“The introduction of the Cartel Offense in the Enterprise Act 2002 has been 
one of the more controversial elements of the U.K.’s recent competition law reforms.”). 
 115. See Norris Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 73, at 2. 
 116. Competition Act, 1998, c. 41. The Competition Act 1998 was created to harmo-
nize U.K. competition law with EU competition law. See JOELSON, supra note 12, at 490. 
Prior to the 1998 Act, U.K. competition law was predominantly administrative, and “was 
perceived by many, although not all, to be toothless and ineffective.” MARK FURSE & 
SUSAN NASH, THE CARTEL OFFENCE 3 (2004). 
 117. See Competition Act, 1998, c. 41, § 2(2); JAMES FLYNN & JEMIMA STRATFORD, 
COMPETITION, UNDERSTANDING THE 1998 ACT 42 (1999). 
 118. See Competition Act, 1998, c. 3, § 36; FLYNN & STRATFORD, supra note 117, at 
142. 
 119. See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 190 (“(1) A person guilty of an offense under 
section 188 is liable- (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding five years or to a fine, or to both . . . .”). Additionally, the Enterprise Act speci-
fies that the cartel offense is an extraditable offense. Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 191. 
 120. See Magistrates’ Court Decision, para. 5. See also, Joshua, supra note 11, at 12–
13 (“[T]he Crown Prosecution Service, representing the U.S. government, seized on the 
closing of this loophole to argue that the underlying hardcore cartel conduct alleged was 
punishable in England—not as price fixing, but as common law conspiracy to defraud.”). 
2007] EXTRADITION FOR ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 225 
other.”121 The 2003 Act applies to offenses that were committed both 
before and after it came into force.122 Thus, because the Magistrates’ 
Court found that conspiracy to defraud and the American price fixing 
charge met the dual criminality requirement, it deemed section 137(2)(b) 
satisfied and considered Norris’s conduct an extradition offense.123 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. International Antitrust Enforcement 
Antitrust enforcement was traditionally considered a domestic issue.124 
Today, the global economy demands that antitrust law and policy adopt 
an increasingly international perspective.125 As globalization of markets 
and competition intensifies, anticompetitive practices by firms become 
international in scope, as do their negative economic effects.126 However, 
there is no international law of antitrust127 and several attempts at creat-
ing an international antitrust regime have failed.128 Furthermore, despite 
                                                                                                             
 121. See Jeremy Lever & John Pike, Cartel Agreements, Criminal Conspiracy and the 
Statutory “Cartel Offense” (pt. 1), 26(2) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 90, 90. 
 122. See KNOWLES, supra note 25, at 21. 
 123. See Magistrates’ Court Decision, para. 8. 
 124. Lucio Lanucara, The Globalization of Antitrust Enforcement: Governance Issues 
and Legal Responses, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 433, 435 (2001–02) (“Until the 
1980s, antitrust enforcement was perceived as an almost exclusively domestic issue.”). 
 125. See MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 13–
14 (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Eleanor M. Fox, Global Markets, National Law, 
and the Regulation of Business: a View From the Top, 75 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 383, 384 
(2001) [hereinafter Fox, Global Markets] (“Because of spill-overs, nationalism, and lack 
of vision, national law may have a poor fit with transnational problems.”). 
 126. DABBAH, supra note 125, at 14; Fox, Global Markets, supra note 125, at 383 
(“[M]arket problems that were once national are now of international dimension.”); Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Hard Core Cartels, Recent 
Progress and Challenges Ahead, 30 (2003), available with a subscription at 
http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/2403011E.PDF [hereinafter OECD Hard Core 
Cartels] (“Globalisation and the internationalisation of markets have had a profound 
effect on competition law enforcement.”). 
 127. See Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 19(2) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 64, 64 (1998). Spencer 
Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 
344 (1997). 
 128. See Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 627, 632 (2001); Waller, supra note 127, 349 (“There have been five great attempts 
to achieve a true international . . . competition law in the twentieth century. None has 
been successful.”); see generally William Sugden, Global Antitrust and the Evolution of 
an International Standard, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989 (2002) (“Efforts to globalize 
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the proliferation of competition law globally,129 legislation varies signifi-
cantly by nation, and no single model applies across borders.130 Yet, in-
ternational enforcement of antitrust remains at the forefront of discussion 
in the antitrust legal community.131 
There is generally global consensus on prohibiting hard core cartels 
and agreement on the economic harm they cause.132 Nonetheless, crimi-
nal legislation against price fixing cartels is scarce across the world.133 
Criminalization of cartel behavior is critical to effective international 
antitrust enforcement.134 Moreover, as the number of cartels that operate 
internationally increases, a global perspective is essential to successful 
enforcement.135 
Increased cooperation among worldwide antitrust authorities has led to 
recent success in international antitrust enforcement for national authori-
ties.136 Bilateral agreements are the most common form of antitrust coop-
eration.137 Additionally, the United States has successfully convinced 
                                                                                                             
antitrust have a long history. Unfortunately, that history is marked more by failure than 
success.”). 
 129. Over ninety countries, which account for almost eighty percent of world produc-
tion, currently have competition laws in place. Diane P. Wood, International Harmoniza-
tion of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or the Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 392 (2002). 
 130. JOELSON, supra note 12, at 6. 
 131. Scholars disagree about “the desirability and the feasibility of an international 
competition law system.” See Waller, supra note 127, at 345. On one hand, skeptics 
doubt the viability of an international antitrust code or even extensive harmonization of 
international laws. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 129, at 405. On the other hand, others 
advocate for an international antitrust regime and favor harmonization of competition 
law. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, International Coordination of Competition Policy: Does 
Global Antitrust Law Have a Future, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 911 (2003). 
 132. See Wood, supra note 129, at 395; Waller, supra note 127, at 404; OECD Hard 
Core Cartels, supra note 126, at 8–9 (“[T]he total harm from cartels is significant indeed, 
surely amounting to many billions of dollars [of affected commerce] each year.”). 
 133. Joshua, Tangled Web, supra note 114, at 2 n.1. (“To date, besides the US and 
Canada—and now the U.K.—France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Slovak Republic, 
Norway, and South Korea have some type of criminal law enforcement [for hard core 
cartels]. . . . Only a limited number of countries provide for sanctions of imprisonment . . 
. .”); OECD Hard Core Cartels, supra note 126, at 29. 
 134. See Joshua, supra note 11, at 13. 
 135. See OECD Hard Core Cartels, supra note 126, at 30. 
 136. See Terry Calvani, Conflict, Cooperation, And Convergence in International 
Competition, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1127, 1127 (“Cooperation is the order of the day.”); 
Laurence K. Gustafson, Criminal Consequences of Anticompetitive Conduct, 45 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 89, 90 (2003); Waller, supra note 127, at 360; OECD Hard Core Cartels, supra 
note 126, at 30–31. 
 137. Waller, supra note 127, at 362. 
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several governments to adopt enforcement policies similar to its own.138 
International organizations like the International Competition Network 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”) also assist coordination of global efforts and the sharing of 
best practices between participating nations.139 Nonetheless, the recent 
trend towards cooperation has been embraced by some countries more 
enthusiastically than others.140 
B. U.S. Cartel Policy and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
The United States has aggressively enforced antitrust law for over a 
hundred years.141 In the United States, collusion among competitors is 
viewed as the “supreme evil of antitrust.”142 Prosecuting cartels is a high 
priority for the United States, particularly international price fixing car-
tels.143 In 2006, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice ob-
tained fines of $473 million and brought criminal cases against sixty-nine 
firms.144 In fact, the United States has created a specialized criminal en-
forcement team that focuses on hard core collusive activity.145 A 
Sherman Act section 1 violation is a felony punishable by fines up to 
                                                                                                             
 138. “Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and the European Union have 
adopted programs similar to the United States programs that encourage pleas and provide 
leniency for cooperating corporations.” See Gustafson, supra note 136, at 95. 
 139. Id. at 95–96. The International Competition Network is an international body that 
“by enhancing convergence and cooperation, . . . promotes more efficient, effective anti-
trust enforcement worldwide.” International Competition Network, http://www.internatio 
nalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2007). 
 140. For example, the developing world supports primary commodity cartels and op-
poses any foreign efforts to extraterritorially apply antitrust laws to limit such cartels. See 
SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD, § 4:2 (2006) 
[hereinafter WALLER, ANTITRUST ABROAD]. But see Calvani, supra note 136, at 1130. 
 141. The Sherman Act was adopted in 1890. As amended, the Sherman Act is set forth 
in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004). 
 142. Verizon Communications, Inc v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 
408 (2004). See also ANTITRUST DIVISION UPDATE, supra note 8 (discussing the Trinko 
decision and noting that cartel enforcement is a high priority of the Antitrust Division). 
 143. Sheryl A. Brown, Antitrust Violations, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 251 (Spring 
2006) (“In 1994, the Clinton Administration simplified cooperation in antitrust enforce-
ment between the United States and foreign nations by signing the International Antitrust 
Enforcement Act. Consequently, aggressive international enforcement of criminal anti-
trust laws and the prosecution of international price-fixing cartels have become top priori-
ties for the Antitrust Division.”). 
 144. Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Speech at the Fordham Competition Law Institute’s Annual Conference of International 
Antitrust Law and Policy: Criminal Enforcement of Antitrust Laws: The U.S. Model, 1 
(September 14, 2006). 
 145. Id. at 2. 
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$100 million for corporations, and $1 million or up to ten years of im-
prisonment for individuals.146 
The United States applied the Sherman Act extraterritorially as early as 
1945. In United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa),147 the 
Second Circuit, sitting for the Supreme Court,148 held a Canadian corpo-
ration liable for Sherman Act violations for conduct that occurred in 
Canada but had consequences within the United States.149 The court ac-
knowledged that imposition of liability upon non-citizens for conduct 
that occurs abroad but violates local law was “settled law.”150 The Alcoa 
effects doctrine, as it came to be known, dominated transnational anti-
trust jurisprudence for many years.151 
Over time, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law flourished.152 
The ability of domestic plaintiffs to bring American antitrust claims 
against foreign defendants,153 and foreign plaintiffs to bring American 
                                                                                                             
 146. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.”). These penalties were increased by a 2004 Amendment 
to the Sherman Act. 
 147. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945). 
 148. See 322 U.S. 716 (1944) (transferring the case to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals for want of a quorum of qualified justices on the Supreme Court of the United 
States). 
 149. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443–44. Aluminum Limited was a Canadian corporation 
that managed the Aluminum Company of America’s properties which were outside of the 
United States. Id. at 439. The court found that Aluminum Limited’s cartel agreements 
that fixed production quotas and later substituted the quota system for a system of royal-
ties were violative of the Sherman Act. Id. at 442–43. See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986) (refusing recovery under the 
Sherman Act for an alleged cartel in the Japanese market, because “American antitrust 
laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations’ economies”). 
 150. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 (stating that “any state may impose liabilities, even 
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states 
will ordinarily recognize”). This approach is known as “objective territoriality,” a subset 
of territorial jurisdiction, one of the five generally accepted bases of international juris-
diction. The other four bases of international jurisdiction are nationality, passive person-
ality, protective principle, and universality. See Ellen S. Podgor, “Defensive Territorial-
ity”: A New Paradigm for the Prosecution of Extraterritorial Business Crimes, 31 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9–10 (2002). 
 151. See JOELSON, supra note 12, at 49. 
 152. For a succinct summary of the evolution of extraterritorial application of U.S. 
antitrust laws, see S. Lynn Diamond, Note, Empagran, the FTAIA and Extraterritorial 
Effects: Guidance to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 805, 811–15 (2006). 
 153. In Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California, the Supreme Court held that 
application of the Sherman Act against a London reinsurance broker that engaged in con-
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antitrust claims against domestic defendants,154 was only limited by the 
principle of international comity155 and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provement Act.156 When presented the opportunity to extend U.S. juris-
diction even further and allow foreign plaintiffs to litigate in the United 
States against foreign defendants for an injury suffered abroad, the Su-
preme Court, in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., declined 
to do so.157 
Still, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice exercises 
jurisdiction to the extent the law will allow.158 Moreover, a United States 
decision to prosecute an antitrust action reflects an Executive Branch 
determination that the “importance of antitrust enforcement outweighs 
any relevant policy concerns.”159 As such, the Department of Justice 
states, courts should not engage in a comity analysis as to “second-guess 
the executive branch’s judgment.”160 
When determining whether to assert jurisdiction in an antitrust action, 
the Antitrust Division accounts for international comity.161 In its analysis, 
the Antitrust Division will consider factors such as the “relative signifi-
cance of the alleged violation within the United States as compared to 
conduct abroad,” “the nationality of the persons involved,” “the degree 
of conflict with foreign law or . . . economic policies,” and the “effec-
                                                                                                             
spiracies to affect the U.S. insurance market was proper. The court rejected the London 
reinsurer’s argument that jurisdiction was contrary to the principle of international com-
ity, finding that “the London reinsurers’ express purpose to affect United States com-
merce and the substantial nature of the effect produced, outweighed the supposed conflict 
that required the exercise of jurisdiction in this litigation.” See 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993). 
 154. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
 155. See U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust 
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1995) § 3.2 [hereinafter Guidelines 
for International Operations], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/inte 
rnat.htm. 
 156. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158 (2004) 
(“The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA) excludes from the 
Sherman Act’s reach much anticompetitive conduct that causes only foreign injury.”). 
 157. Id. at 175. 
 158. See Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 155, § 3.1. 
 159. Id. § 3.2. 
 160. Id. This position has been criticized as a “broad assertion of power” that fails to 
“cite . . . precedent for applying one jurisdictional standard to government prosecutions 
and another to private suits,” fails to note that “Congress is given responsibility under the 
Constitution for regulating commerce with foreign nations,” and disregards the fact that a 
“court must construe the application of the antitrust laws to foreign commerce as Con-
gress, not the executive branch, deems appropriate.” Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality 
in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 189–90 (1999). 
 161. See Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 155, § 3.2. 
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tiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. action.”162 The de-
cision about whether to pursue a case is nonetheless highly discretionary, 
and ultimately if a foreign country’s antitrust regime does not align with 
U.S. policies, the factors outlined for consideration by the Antitrust Divi-
sion weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction.163 
C. U.K. Cartel Policy and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
U.K. competition law aims to correct distortions to the competitive 
process within the United Kingdom.164 In contrast with the United States, 
where private enforcement of antitrust laws is common, the United 
Kingdom only recently recognized a private right of action for violations 
of U.K. competition law.165 Another significant difference between U.K. 
and U.S. cartel law is liability of corporations.166 The U.K. Enterprise 
Act cartel offense does not provide for corporate criminal liability, 
whereas in the United States corporations may be held liable for any anti-
trust violation.167 In addition, as a member of the European Community 
(“EC”), the United Kingdom must enforce its competition policy within 
that of the EC, which itself has an active competition regime.168 
The United Kingdom also views cartels as criminal, but not until rela-
tively recently with the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002 (“2002 
Act”). Deterrence was the main objective of introducing a criminal of-
fense for cartel participation with the 2002 Act.169 Creation of the crimi-
                                                                                                             
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Enterprise Bill, Bill [115], Research Paper 02/21, Apr. 4, 2002, 16. 
 165. See Barry Rodger, Competition Law Litigation in the U.K. Courts: A Study of All 
Cases to 2004, 27(5) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 241 (2006). 
 166. Compare Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. § 188 (“An individual is guilty of an of-
fence if he dishonestly agrees . . .”) and Joshua, Tangled Web, supra note 114, 623 (stat-
ing that “[t]he offence can be committed only by an individual, not a company”), with 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (“The word ‘person’ or ‘persons,’ wherever used in sections 
1 to 7 of this title shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under 
or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, 
the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.”). 
 167. See Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. § 188; 15 U.S.C. § 7. 
 168. See FURSE & NASH, supra note 116, at 6. 
 169. See MacCulloch, supra note 114, at 616. Deterrence is a common aim of includ-
ing criminal sanctions in cartel legislation, and one that is recommended by the OECD. 
See OECD Hard Core Cartels, supra note 126, at 27, 30; Patricia Hanh Rosochowicz, 
The Appropriateness of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcement of Competition Law, 25(12) 
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 752, 753 (2004). 
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nal cartel offense was a controversial element of the 2002 Act.170 Some 
regard it as “one of the most significant developments in U.K. criminal 
justice policy in the last decade.”171 Indeed, it may demonstrate that the 
United Kingdom’s perspective on competition is converging with that of 
the United States, which is perhaps why the British government is will-
ing to proceed with Norris’s extradition today.172 
Although the United Kingdom has taken steps towards aligning its 
competition policy with that of the United States, there are differences 
which may prove significant.173 Specifically, the U.K. cartel offense in-
corporates a “dishonesty” requirement.174 The drafters of the 2002 Act 
argue that the dishonesty requirement communicates the seriousness of 
the offense, but some critics maintain that because the term “dishonesty” 
is undefined,175 it will lead to great difficulty in successfully convicting 
offenders.176 This element of the cartel offense contrasts greatly with the 
U.S. Sherman Act, which is based on conspiracy, and likely will lead to 
greatly varied enforcement.177 
Historically, the United Kingdom was hostile to extraterritorial en-
forcement of American antitrust law.178 In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
United Kingdom enacted retaliatory legislation known as “blocking stat-
utes” in an effort to curb extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust law 
by American courts.179 When the United States exercised jurisdiction 
                                                                                                             
 170. See Enterprise Bill, Bill [115], Research Paper 02/21, Apr. 4, 2002, 53, available 
at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2002/rp02-021.pdf. See e.g., Mac-
Culloch, supra note 114, at 616. 
 171. Joshua, Tangled Web, supra note 114, at 620; see MacCulloch, supra note 114, at 
616. 
 172. See Joshua, supra note 11, at 13 (“Ironically, it was not the U.K.’s criminalization 
of cartels as such but rather the change in official perceptions that led the US to request 
Mr. Norris’s extradition.”); MacCulloch, supra note 114, at 616 (“The Cartel Offence 
reflects a move within the U.K. regime towards a dual alignment adapting . . . elements 
from the US antitrust regime . . . .”). 
 173. See Joshua, Tangled Web, supra note 114, at 625. 
 174. Id. at 624–25. See also Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40. § 188 (“An individual is guilty 
of an offence if he dishonestly agrees with one or more other persons to make or imple-
ment, or to cause to be made or implemented, arrangements of the following kind relating 
to at least two undertakings (A and B).”). 
 175. “The definition of ‘dishonesty’ under English law largely stems from cases under 
the Theft Act 1968. Dishonesty is a matter of fact, not law, for the jury to decide in light 
of the particular circumstances of the case.” MacCulloch, supra note 114, at 621. 
 176. See Joshua, Tangled Web, supra note 114, at 626. 
 177. Id. at 625. 
 178. See MacCulloch, supra note 114, at 623. 
 179. See Anthony J. Carroll, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws 
and Retaliatory Legislation in the United Kingdom and Australia, 13 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 377, 377 (1984) (discussing the British Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 
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over British citizens whose anticompetitive acts took place in the United 
Kingdom, the United Kingdom objected and refused to compel its citi-
zens to cooperate with American pre-trial discovery.180 Conflict ensued 
for many years because competition policy was considered an American 
ideal.181 
The United Kingdom’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction in the 
context of antitrust, particularly the effects doctrine, is markedly differ-
ent from that of the United States.182 The United Kingdom has generally 
opposed the effects doctrine.183 The United Kingdom expressed the view 
that jurisdiction may only be exercised in antitrust matters over foreign 
corporations on the basis of either the territorial principle or the national-
ity principle,184 and even then it should be narrowly applied.185 Specifi-
cally, with regard to the territorial principle, the United Kingdom stated 
that extraterritorial jurisdiction was justified only if conduct of the for-
eign national or foreign corporation took place within the state claiming 
jurisdiction.186 
D. Extradition for Antitrust Offenders 
According to U.S. law, the United States may unquestionably exercise 
jurisdiction over Norris for his participation in a cartel that impacted 
American commerce.187 But, is it prudent for the United States to inter-
                                                                                                             
and its retaliatory nature in response to United States prosecution of a uranium cartel); 
see also Lanucara, supra note 124, at 436 (“[T]he extraterritorial exercise of sovereignty 
by U.S. authorities, sanctioned by U.S. courts, was met by resistance from European 
partners, especially France and the United Kingdom.”). 
 180. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] A.C. 547 
(H.L.) (addressing an American request for oral examination and production of docu-
ments from U.K. citizens in relation to the existence of an international uranium cartel). 
 181. Calvani, supra note 136, at 1130. 
 182. See Tapio Puurunen, The Legislative Jurisdiction of States Over Transactions in 
International Electronic Commerce, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 689, 720 
(2000) (illustrating British and American interpretations of the objective territorial prin-
ciple with the effects doctrine). 
 183. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 315 (5th ed. 
1998). 
 184. See supra note 149. 
 185. See Statement of Principles According to Which, in the View of the United King-
dom Government, Jurisdiction May Be Exercised Over Foreign Corporations in Anti-
Trust Matters, reprinted in BROWNLIE, supra note 183, at 316–17. 
 186. Id. at 316–17. 
 187. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus., 109 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (reversing 
dismissal of a Sherman Act suit against a Japanese corporation where the price fixing 
activities took place entirely in Japan); Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 (“[I]t is well estab-
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vene in the conduct of insulated foreign parties?188 Domestic regulators 
and prosecutors have the discretion to exercise such jurisdiction,189 which 
undoubtedly implicates foreign policy and may have economic ramifica-
tions. Moreover, using extradition to prosecute foreign nationals for U.S. 
antitrust violations may result in improper application of the law by 
courts eager to further their national competition polity. As seen in Nor-
ris, this may result in an unjust retroactive application of recently imple-
mented competition policy. 
The argument in favor of enforcing U.S. antitrust laws on foreign par-
ties is based on the assumption that all parties that participate in U.S. 
markets, both domestic and foreign, benefit from the transparency of the 
U.S. market and openness of market information.190 Furthermore, the 
United States has an interest in preserving market order.191 By enforcing 
its antitrust laws against hard core international cartels, the United States 
is arguably addressing a problem that concerns the international commu-
nity as a whole.192 Still, there exists a tension between the benefits to be 
gained by global enforcement and jurisdictional norms within the inter-
national community.193 
One approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction over business crimes, in-
cluding antitrust violations, is “defensive territoriality.”194 The theory of 
defensive territoriality argues that the United States should exercise ju-
risdiction over business crimes on a limited basis, and should take a de-
fensive approach. By this theory, the United States should only prosecute 
when it is necessary for protection, when a U.S. administrative agency 
controls the business entity, or when the business entity acted outside the 
United States to intentionally evade U.S. jurisdiction.195 The rationale 
behind this principle is that prosecution of certain crimes is subject to the 
“whims of prosecutors” and political agendas, and extraterritorial prose-
cution is potentially limitless in the era of globalization.196 Additionally, 
                                                                                                             
lished by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce 
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.”). 
 188. See S.W. O’Donnell, Antitrust Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over State Owned 
Enterprises and the End of Prudential Prophylactic Judicial Doctrines, 26 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 247, 261 (2003). 
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 190. Id. at 259. 
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 192. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 
251, 271 (2006). 
 193. Id. at 255. 
 194. See generally Podgor, supra note 150. 
 195. Id. at 28. 
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defensive territoriality argues that the uniqueness of business crimes, as 
distinct from other transnational crimes like terrorism, calls for limited 
application of U.S. law extraterritorially.197 That is, because business 
crimes can be related to a legitimate entity, globalization has impacted 
business, and business crimes have both a criminal and civil dimension, 
the United States should limit extraterritorial prosecution of them.198 
On the other hand, one may argue that it is efficient for the United 
States, with a developed body of antitrust law and powerful remedies, to 
reach as far as the law may allow in order to stop anticompetitive prac-
tices that harm the global economy. This argument may be persuasive in 
the context of cartels, where the general consensus is that cartels should 
be eliminated. However, this position fails for several reasons. First, al-
though many nations have competition laws, their attitude and policies 
about the aims of such legislation differ.199 Even when a foreign jurisdic-
tion has a viable antitrust regime, enforcement techniques may differ 
substantially.200 Second, many countries resent imposition of American 
economic policies and laws, and oppose aggressive enforcement against 
their citizens or businesses.201 And finally, there may be economic impli-
cations such as hostility towards American business.202 This rationale for 
limited exercise of U.S. antitrust jurisdiction, despite potential efficiency, 
weighs in favor of limited pursuit of extradition for antitrust violations. 
CONCLUSION 
In Norris, the Court properly held it was not a matter for the judiciary 
to determine whether the United States should be removed as a desig-
nated territory under the Extradition 2003. However, the Court should 
have decided that the dual criminality requirement was not met without 
awaiting determination of the Bermingham decision. When Norris alleg-
edly engaged in the price fixing agreements, cartel participation was not 
a crime in the United Kingdom. The Court erred by allowing common 
law conspiracy to defraud to serve as the comparable U.K. offense. 
Moreover, the common law conspiracy to defraud has never been suc-
                                                                                                             
 197. Id. at 15–16. 
 198. Id. at 16–18. 
 199. WALLER, ANTITRUST ABROAD, supra note 140, § 4:1. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.; see also O’Shea, supra note 53 (“[A]ttempting to manage a company in ac-
cordance with a less predictable legal environment will be costly for business in the short 
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cessfully prosecuted in the United Kingdom where the underlying con-
duct was cartel participation.203 
Although the U.S. Department of Justice may be enthusiastic about the 
potential to use extradition to reach antitrust violators,204 the United 
States should pursue extradition of foreign antitrust offenders only on a 
limited basis. The Norris case illustrates the potential consequences of 
the United States flexing its antitrust muscle in the United Kingdom. In 
light of the negative public reaction in the United Kingdom to the Norris 
extradition, there is a risk of history repeating itself with blocking legis-
lation or other protective measures. Those consequences may amplify if 
the same efforts are directed towards a less friendly nation. 
Extradition of antitrust offenders allows the United States to expand 
the global reach of its antitrust policy. It implicates significant foreign 
policy considerations and may also frustrate effective global antitrust 
enforcement.205 Further, there may be economic ramifications if foreign 
enterprises view the United States as a risky place to transact their busi-
ness because of increased exposure to criminal antitrust prosecution. In 
sum, the United States should approach use of extradition to prosecute 
antitrust violations with caution and exercise limited discretion in deter-
mining when to pursue extradition as an avenue for enforcement. 
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